HB 542: Rep. Cohn's Amendment -- Please Support!

Rep. Seth Cohn, R-Canterbury, has proposed the following amendment:

NH RSA 193:1 Duty of Parent; Compulsory Attendance by Pupil.

V. No district shall compel a parent to send his child to any school
or program to which he may be conscientiously opposed, nor shall
any district approve or disapprove a parent's education program
or curriculum.

This amendment adds nothing new to statute that isn't already in effect via court decisions or the statute for regulating private schools, RSA 186:11. However, it is extremely useful in that it places a marker into statute to prevent parents from sliding back down a slippery slope each year, arguing against the same increases in state regulation.

Support for this amendment to HB 542 would redeem Republicans who promised to uphold the rights of homeschoolers.

Please contact all members of the House Education Committee and ask that they vote HB 542 OTP (ought to pass) with the Cohn amendment.

The committee will vote in executive session on Wednesday, March 9th at 10:15 am in LOB (Legislative Office Building) Room 207.

Rep. Mirski’s Ethical Conflicts of Interest

Rep. Paul Mirski R-Enfield needn’t chase Rep. Michael Brunelle D-Manchester if he wants to eliminate ethical conflicts of interest within the House. He need only look in his own back yard. Rep. Mirski is co-sponsoring a controversial home schooling bill, HB 301, drafted by unregistered lobbyists from the Home School Legal Defense Association in Virginia. He has knowingly protected these lobbyists and undermined the constitutional rights of home schooling parents.

Rep. Mirski is a good friend of HSLDA, as one of their lawyers was his former Enfield neighbor. The prime sponsor of HB 301, Rep. Jim Parison, R-New Ipswich, is another good friend and a member of HSLDA, as well as the former president of HSLDA’s state affiliate group, which incidentally requires a statement of faith in order to join. Rep. Parison also shares Rep. Mirski’s summer home in Florida. It’s one big happy family.

HSLDA’s quasi-legislators boast that they are “the only national organization lobbying on behalf of homeschoolers.” They draft restrictive home schooling legislation across the country and then financially benefit by offering parents legal protection from these same laws. HB 301 proposes to criminalize parents, subordinating them to their districts. HSLDA has earned nearly one million dollars in protection fees from NH families since drafting New Hampshire’s first home education law in 1990.

Ironically, the penalty for HSLDA’s failure to register as a lobbyist is a felony under NH state law. Yet HSLDA has never once registered or worn those little orange lobbyist badges. Rep. Mirski’s own committee just heard a bill, HB 180, which attempted to address the problem of quasi-legislators writing our laws. Rep. Mirski voted to kill the bill, argued against it on the floor, and knowingly protected HSLDA’s unregistered lobbyists. It’s as if Rep. Mirski put a HSLDA lobbyist on the floor of the House, since HSLDA member Rep. Parison carries their water.

HSLDA’s bill, HB 301, proposes to criminalize home schooling parents for “failure to educate” their children based upon the state’s approval or disapproval of the outcome of their programs. HSDLA started lobbying NH legislators last October for support of this measure. This bill places inequitable requirements upon home schoolers which cannot be imposed upon other private teachers in this state. To do so would violate Art. 6, Pt. I of the NH Constitution.

Rep. Mirski ought to give up his crusade against Rep. Brunelle and acknowledge his own ethical conflicts, as well as his inappropriate opposition to the rights of parents.

As a result, the House Education Committee has retained all homeschooling bills in committee this year, including HB 595, which addressed the constitutional problems in the current law, disappointing parents across the state. Rep. Seth Cohn R-Canterbury proposed a stop-gap amendment to HB 542, which would prevent parents from sliding back down a slippery slope each year, arguing against the same increases in state regulation. Support for this amendment to HB 542 would redeem Republicans who promised to uphold the rights of homeschoolers.

NHFamiliesForEducation@gmail.com

www.NHFFE.org

The Underground Classroom: How Oppressive Laws are Forcing Families into Hiding

http://kelly.halldorson.com/blog/?p=3113

Here is article explaining the political concerns of a New Hampshire family of unschoolers. It's one of many interesting articles on Kelly's blog, which describes her family's life on a converted school bus.

HSLDA's 990 Tax Return 2009

Click on a page image to see an enlarged copy.

HELP Restore Subcommittee Work on Homeschooling Bills

It was a difficult task to merge two opposing bills, as House Chair Balboni asked, but progress was being made in the first two sub-committee meetings. This progress was prematurely terminated. For whatever reason, this was wrong. Parents don't want their homeschooling bills retained in committee indefinitely.

Last year HB 1580 was 3 votes short in committee and 16 votes short on the floor in a Democratic House and if this is the best the Republicans can do for us, retain our bills in committee, then parents are ready to vote them out. Seriously. Something has to give.

This is where every parent comes in, frankly regardless of which side of the fence you're sitting on. We can unite on this issue.

Now to the practical details. HB 301-FN has a fiscal note and a deadline to be acted upon by Thursday February 24th in order to go to a second committee. HB 595 does not have to be acted upon until March 17th. The committee can still continue to work resolving these issues using HB 595 for three more weeks!

In order to remedy this problem, parents need to:

1) Ask these members of the House to address this problem and restore the sub-committee.

Education Chairman Balboni home 598-38 51 michael.balboni@leg.state.nh.us
Majority Leader DJ Bettencourt home 898-4653 DJ.Bettencourt@leg.state.nh.us
House Speaker O'Brien work 271-3661 william.obrien@leg.state.nh.us

2) Contact members of the House Education Committee and ask them to restore the sub-committee.

Use NH Parents First's House Education Committee contact list.

3) Attend the Executive session at 1:00 PM in LOB 207.


Karen Testerman, former GOP gubernatorial candidate, has offered to help lead this effort with press releases and letters to our GOP House leadership and House Education Committee. She will attend the House Education Committee's Executive Session on Thursday, February 24th at 1:00 PM in the LOB Room 207.

Please get behind this effort to restore the natural rights of parents in New Hampshire!!!

------------------------------------------


Dear Mr. Speaker, Mr. Bettencourt and Mr. Balboni,

I am writing to you to ask you to assist in resolving the opposing home school legislation currently before the House. Specifically, the scheduled sub-committee meetings to address HB 301 and HB 595 have been canceled. I am asking you to reinstate these sub-committee meetings so this issue can be resolved.

The laws governing home schooling in NH are among the most restrictive in the nation. May I remind you that repeatedly the Supreme Court of the United States has issued opinions regarding parental rights. "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children--is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." "In Troxel v. Granville (2000), the Supreme Court confirmed the fundamental right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children. The Court included a parent's fundamental right to educate his or her child in those fundamental rights, which encompasses the right to choose private or home schooling."

It is in the best interests of the state to resolve and remove the unconstitutional restrictive elements of our statutes to protect the fundamental liberties interests of parents. Protecting, not restricting, our liberties is the fundamental purpose of government. Resolving the conflict in laws restricting our fundamental liberties to oversee and provide for the education of our children must be addressed. Please restore the sub-committee meetings and allow the process to work.

Sincerely,

Karen

Franklin, NH
karen@karentesterman.net

"The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government." --Thomas Jefferson, letter to The Republican Citizens of Washington County, Maryland, 1809

HB 301: the State's "compelling interest" vs. the Parent's Natural Right

Here's what happens when parents can be considered criminals for exercising their natural right to instruct their children. Parents were arrested in New York state in January of 2011 for instructing their children under the "child endangerment" laws.

http://www.cbs6albany.com/articles/district-1269895-school-county.html

This situation can happen in New Hampshire too. If HB 301 passes parents can be charged under the same criminal laws for "child endangerment."

HB 301 was drafted by HSLDA just like the Home Instruction regulations in New York were drafted by HSLDA. So just how good are HSLDA laws for protecting the natural rights of parents?

New York statute requires for attendance upon instruction "at a public school or elsewhere." Since the Packer decision of 1948, New York has operated without mandatory registration for private schools. What happened to "equal treatment" for homeschooling parents in New York? Why were these parent arrested for failure to register their home instruction?

In 1988 Attorney Michael Farris, president of HSLDA helped draft Home Instruction regulations for New York. Prior to 1988, parents operated under the Equivalency law, "elsewhere than at a public school." Equivalency laws place the burden of proof upon the state. Home instruction regulations place the burden of proof upon the parent.

Why shift the burden? HSLDA supports the theory that the state has a "compelling interest" in education which they believe supersede the natural rights of parents. HSLDA also opposes rights of conscience and intellectual freedom. For more information on New York homeschooling go to Otherwise Providing Education iN New York


Keep in mind that New York state only has regulations, without any statutory authority, imposed by HSLDA in 1988. This is unconstitutional. This is exactly the same problem parents in NH faced last year with DoE rules exceeding statutory authority. Fortunately, NH parents screamed in opposition!

Why would anyone in New Hampshire want mandatory registration? It's dangerous in New York. Illinois parents just killed a bill to introduce mandatory registration.

Parents should fight mandatory notification in New Hampshire. They should be delighted to support Rep. Jones' bill, HB 595, and do absolutely everything in their power to get it passed.

HB 595: Proposed Amendment #2

Amendment to HB 595

Amend the bill by replacing it in its entirety with the following:

AN ACT amending the compulsory school attendance statutes to permit parent-directed instruction programs and repealing the home education statutes.

SPONSORS: Rep. L. Jones, Straf 1; Rep. Manuse, Rock 5; Rep. Cohn, Merr 6; Rep. Baldasaro, Rock 3; Rep. C. Vita, Straf 3; Rep. Accornero, Belk 4; Rep. Avard, Hills 20; Rep. S. Palmer, Hills 6; Rep. Simpson, Belk 1; Sen. White, Dist 9; Sen. Forsythe, Dist 4; Sen. Luther, Dist 12

COMMITTEE: Education

ANALYSIS

This bill:

I. Repeals the home education statute.

II. Permits parent-directed instruction programs.

III. Asserts that it is the natural right of a parent to determine and direct the instruction of his or her child and limits the involvement of the state in parent-directed instruction programs only to cases in which there is probable cause to believe that a parent is not instructing his or her child.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Explanation: Matter added to current law appears in bold italics.

Matter removed from current law appears [in brackets and struckthrough.]

Matter which is either (a) all new or (b) repealed and reenacted appears in regular type.

11-0755

04/05

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand Eleven

AN ACT amending the compulsory school attendance statutes to permit parent-directed instruction programs and repealing the home education statutes.

Be it Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened:

1 Statement of Purpose. It is the natural right and duty of parents to determine and direct the instruction of their children for their education. The general court acknowledges that the primary and natural instructors of a child are his or her parents, and the general court guarantees the right and duty of parents to provide for the instruction of their children. Parents shall be free to provide this instruction in the manner and at the location of their choosing, including in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognized or established by their resident school district or by the state or in other places where instruction can be given.

2 Child Protection Act; Definitions. Amend RSA 169-C:3, XIX(b) to read as follows:

(b) Who is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, [education as required by law,] or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, when it is established that his health has suffered or is very likely to suffer serious impairment; and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of the parents, guardian or custodian; or

3 Truant Officers; Duties. Amend RSA 189:36, I to read as follows:

I. Truant officers shall, when directed by the school board, enforce the laws and regulations relating to truants and children between the ages of 6 and 18 years not attending school or who are not participating in an alternative learning plan under RSA 193:1, I[(h)] (b)(8); and the laws relating to the attendance at school of children between the ages of 6 and 18 years; and shall have authority without a warrant to take and place in school any children found employed contrary to the laws relating to the employment of children, or violating the laws relating to the compulsory attendance at school of children under the age of 18 years, and the laws relating to child labor. No [home school pupil] child in a parent-directed instruction program nor any person between the ages of 6 and 18 who meets any of the requirements of RSA 193:1, I[(c)-(h)] (b)(2)-(8) shall be deemed a truant.

4 School Attendance; Duty of Parents. Amend the section heading of RSA 193:1 and RSA 193:1, I to read as follows:

193:1 Rights and Duties of [Parent] Parents; Compulsory Attendance by Pupil.

I. It is the natural right of parents to determine and direct the instruction of their children. A parent of any child at least 6 years of age and under 18 years of age:

(a) Shall instruct such child or cause such child to be instructed as determined by the parent; or

(b) Shall cause such child to attend the public school to which the child is assigned in the child’s resident district. Such child shall attend the public school to which the child is assigned full time when such school is in session unless:

(1) The child is receiving parent-directed instruction and is therefore exempt from this requirement;

(A) Notification (optional). A parent may notify the superintendent of his or her resident school district or the principal of a nonpublic school of his or her decision to involve his or her child in a parent-directed instruction program pursuant to this section. Such notification shall not be required of a parent, and failure to send such notification shall not be considered probable cause under RSA 193:1(I-a).

(B) A parent who chooses to notify the superintendent of the resident school district or the principle of a nonpublic school under RSA 193:1(I)(b)(1)(A) may submit such notification within 14 days of the date the child is withdrawn from a public or nonpublic school, or moves into the resident school district, or reaches compulsory attendance age pursuant to this section. Notification may include the name, address, and age of each child whose education is being personally directed by the parent pursuant to this chapter. A parent may also send such notification if he or she ends a parent-directed instruction program for any period of time and then subsequently resumes such a program. A parent may choose to enroll a child previously involved in a parent-directed instruction program in a public or private school at any time that any other child may be enrolled.

(C) The superintendent of the resident school district or the principle of a nonpublic school receiving notification pursuant to RSA 193:1(I)(b)(1)(A) and to RSA 193:1(I)(b)(1)(B) shall provide written acknowledgment of the notification within 14 days of receipt of the notification.

(D) Privacy. Records or information maintained by the superintendent of the resident school district or the principal of a nonpublic school under this chapter shall not be public records pursuant to RSA 91-A and shall not be released to any person or agency without the express written consent of the parent.

[(a)] (2) The child is attending a New Hampshire public school outside the district to which the child is assigned or an approved New Hampshire private school for the same time;

[(b) The child is receiving home education pursuant to RSA 193-A and is therefore exempt from this requirement;

(c)] (3) The relevant school district superintendent has excused a child from attendance because the child is physically or mentally unable to attend school, or has been temporarily excused upon the request of the parent for purposes agreed upon by the school authorities and the parent. Such excused absences shall not be permitted if they cause a serious adverse effect upon the student’s educational progress. Students excused for such temporary absences may be claimed as full-time pupils for purposes of calculating state aid under RSA 186-C:18 and adequate education grants under RSA 198:41;

[(d)] (4) The child is attending a public or private school located in another state which has been approved by the state education agency of the state in which the school is located;

[(e)] (5) The pupil has been exempted from attendance pursuant to RSA 193:5;

[(f)] (6) The pupil has successfully completed all requirements for graduation and the school district is prepared to issue a diploma or the pupil has successfully achieved the equivalent of a high school diploma by [either:

(1)] obtaining a GED certificate[; or

(2) Documenting the completion of a home school program at the high school level by submitting a certificate or letter to the department of education];

[(g)] (7) The pupil has been accepted into an accredited postsecondary education program; or

[(h)] (8) The pupil obtains a waiver from the superintendent, which shall only be granted upon proof that the pupil is 16 years of age or older and has an alternative learning plan for obtaining either a high school diploma or its equivalent.

[(1)] (A) Alternative learning plans shall include age-appropriate academic rigor and the flexibility to incorporate the pupil’s interests and manner of learning. These plans may include, but are not limited to, such components or combination of components of extended learning opportunities as independent study, private instruction, performing groups, internships, community service, apprenticeships, and on-line courses.

[(2)] (B) Alternative learning plans shall be developed, and amended if necessary, in consultation with the pupil, a school guidance counselor, the school principal and at least one parent or guardian of the pupil, and submitted to the school district superintendent for approval.

[(3)] (C) If the superintendent does not approve the alternative learning plan, the parent or guardian of the pupil may appeal such decision to the local school board. A parent or guardian may appeal the decision of the local school board to the state board of education consistent with the provisions of RSA 21-N:11, III.

5 Compulsory School Attendance; Definitions. Amend RSA 193:1, III to read as follows:

III. In this section[,]:

(a) “Child” means a child or children of compulsory attendance age who is a resident of New Hampshire.

(b) “Parent” means a parent, guardian, or person having legal custody of a child.

(c) “Parent-directed instruction” means instruction determined and directed by the parent or guardian of a child who is of compulsory school age. Such instruction may also be referred to as “homeschooling.”

6 New Paragraph; School Attendance; Limitations on State, County and Municipal Action. Amend RSA 193:1 by inserting after paragraph 1 the following new paragraph:

I-a. Under no circumstances shall the neglect provisions of RSA 169-C and RSA 169-D apply to a parent involved in parent-directed instruction. Instead, only the following civil procedure shall apply to a parent involved in parent-directed instruction:

(a) Original jurisdiction of any action brought against a parent engaged in parent-directed instruction pursuant to this chapter shall be in the Superior Court in the county of the parent's residence.

(b) The state, a county or any local jurisdiction shall not interfere with the natural right of a parent to instruct his or her child unless the acting jurisdiction has probable cause to believe that a parent involved in a parent-directed instruction program has failed to instruct or cause the child to be instructed.

(c) If there is probable cause to believe that a parent involved in a parent-directed instruction program has failed to instruct or cause the child to be instructed, a local jurisdiction may investigate, after prior notice to the parent, to determine if there is sufficient evidence to proceed against the parent. The Division of Children, Youth and Family Services shall not investigate any case of failure to instruct or cause the child to be instructed. No other state agency shall investigate any case of failure to instruct or cause the child to be instructed. Not more than one jurisdiction shall ever investigate a case of failure to instruct or cause the child to be instructed.

(d) A local jurisdiction shall only proceed against a parent in accordance with the Constitutional provisions for due process and a fair trial, during which the parent shall retain the presumption of innocence.

(e) A local jurisdiction shall not compel a parent to submit evidence to prove his or her innocence, nor shall the local jurisdiction presume such parent has failed to instruct or cause the child to be instructed based on the parent's failure to submit such evidence.

(f) In any action relating to a parent involved in a parent-directed instruction program, no finding or opinion that a parent has failed to instruct or cause the child to be instructed shall issue except upon evidence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

(g) A parent involved in a parent-directed instruction program who has failed to instruct or cause the child to be instructed may be found guilty only of a civil violation. Under no circumstances shall the state, a county, a local jurisdiction, or any other government official, including but not limited to a court, remove a child from a parent's custody based on an allegation or finding of failure to instruct or cause the child to be instructed or for any other allegation or finding pertaining to a parent-directed instruction program. Only after the procedure in this section has been followed, and a court has found by evidence proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in three separate court proceedings, that a parent has failed to instruct the child or failed to cause the child to be instructed, may the court, as of the third court proceeding, order the child to be returned to a public or nonpublic school, as shall be determined by the parent.

(h) No state agency or local jurisdiction shall have authority to write or enforce rules relative to parent-directed instruction programs.

7 School Attendance; Access to Public School Programs. Amend RSA 193:1-c to read as follows:

193:1-c Access to Public School Programs by Pupils in Nonpublic or [Home Educated Pupils] Parent-Directed Instruction Programs.

I. Pupils in nonpublic or [home educated pupils] parent-directed instruction programs shall have access to curricular courses and cocurricular programs offered by the school district in which the pupil resides. The local school board may adopt a policy regulating participation in curricular courses and cocurricular programs, provided that such policy shall not be more restrictive for [non-public or home educated pupils] pupils in a nonpublic or parent-directed instruction program than the policy governing the school district’s resident pupils. In this section, “cocurricular” shall include those activities which are designed to supplement and enrich regular academic programs of study, provide opportunities for social development, and encourage participation in clubs, athletics, performing groups, and service to school and community. For purposes of allowing access as described in this section, a [“home educated pupil”] pupil in a parent-directed instruction program shall not include any pupil who has graduated from a high school level program [of home education,] or its equivalent, or has attained the age of 21.

II. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a parent to establish a [home education] parent-directed instruction program which exceeds the provisions of RSA 193:1.

8 School Attendance; Bylaws as to Nonattendance. Amend RSA 193:16 to read as follows:

193:16 Bylaws as to Nonattendance. Districts may make bylaws, not repugnant to law, concerning habitual truants and children between the ages of 6 and 18 years not attending school or who are not participating in an alternative learning plan under RSA 193:1, I[(h)] (b)(8), and to compel the attendance of such children at school; failure to comply with such bylaws shall constitute a violation for each offense.

9 Legislative Youth Advisory Council; Membership. Amend RSA 19-K:2, I-IV to read as follows:

I. The president of the senate shall appoint the following 7 members:

(a) Three youths who are students in secondary schools, who are [home school] students in a parent-directed instruction program as provided in RSA 193:1, I, or who are enrolled in programs that lead to a secondary school diploma, certificate of attendance, or general equivalency diploma.

(b) Three youths who are residents of this state and who are students at postsecondary education institutions located in the state.

(c) One member of the senate.

II. The speaker of the house of representatives shall appoint the following 8 members:

(a) Four youths who are students in secondary schools, who are [home school] students in a parent-directed instruction program as provided in RSA 193:1, I, or who are enrolled in programs that lead to a secondary school diploma, certificate of attendance, or general equivalency diploma.

(b) Three youths who are residents of this state and who are students at postsecondary education institutions located in the state.

(c) One member of the house of representatives.

III. The governor shall appoint the following 3 members:

(a) Two youths who are students in secondary schools, who are [home school] students in a parent-directed instruction program as provided in RSA 193:1, I, or who are enrolled in programs that lead to a secondary school diploma, certificate of attendance, or general equivalency diploma.

(b) One youth who is a resident of this state and who is a student at a postsecondary education institution located in the state.

IV. The secretary of state shall appoint the following 3 members:

(a) Two youths who are students in secondary schools, who are [home school] students in a parent-directed instruction program as provided in RSA 193:1, I, or who are enrolled in programs that lead to a secondary school diploma, certificate of attendance, or general equivalency diploma.

(b) One youth who is a resident of this state and who is a student at a postsecondary education institution located in the state.

10 Special Education; Advisory Committee. Amend RSA 186-C:3-b, II(p) to read as follows:

(p) One individual representing children with disabilities who are [home-schooled] in a parent-directed instruction program as specified in RSA 193:1, I, appointed by the governor.

11 Granite State Scholars Program; Scholar Designation. Amend RSA 188-D:39, II to read as follows:

II. The state board of education shall adopt rules, pursuant to RSA 541-A, relative to establishing the granite state scholar designation in high schools that do not calculate class rank, in non-accredited high schools, and for [home schooled] students in a parent-directed instruction program as provided in RSA 193:1, I.

12 Statewide Education Improvement and Assessment Program; Assessment Required. Amend RSA 193-C:6 to read as follows:

193-C:6 Assessment Required. Each year, a statewide assessment shall be administered in all school districts in the state in grades 3 through 8 and one grade in high school. All public school students in the designated grades shall participate in the assessment, unless such student is exempted, or provided that the commissioner of the department of education may, through an agreement with another state when such state and New Hampshire are parties to an interstate agreement, allow pupils to participate in that state's assessment program as an alternative to the assessment required under this chapter. [Home educated students] Students in a parent-directed instruction program may contact their local school districts if they wish to participate in the statewide assessment. Private schools may contact the department of education to participate in the statewide assessment.

13 Safe School Zones; Definitions. Amend RSA 193-D:1, III to read as follows:

III. “School” means any public or private elementary, secondary, or secondary vocational-technical school in New Hampshire. It shall not include [home schools under RSA 193-A] a personal residence or other space used to conduct a parent-directed instruction program pursuant to RSA 193:1, I.

14 Chartered Public Schools; Establishment and Application. Amend RSA 194-B:3, VIII to read as follows:

VIII. [Home education programs established pursuant to RSA 193-A] A parent-directed instruction program as specified in RSA 193:1, I shall not be eligible to be a chartered public school.

15 School Administrative Units; Superintendent Services. Amend RSA 194-C:4, II(d) to read as follows:

(d) Compliance with laws, regulations, and rules regarding special education, Title IX, the Americans with Disabilities Act, [home education,] minimum standards, student records, sexual harassment, and other matters as may from time to time occur.

16 Cooperative School Districts; Procedure for Formation. Amend RSA 195:18, III(e) to read as follows:

(e) The method of apportioning the operating expenses of the cooperative school district among the several preexisting districts and the time and manner of payment of such shares. [Home education pupils] Students in a parent-directed instruction program who do not receive services from the cooperative school district[, except an evaluation pursuant to RSA 193-A:6, II] shall not be included in the average daily membership relative to apportionment formulas.

17 Cooperative School Districts; Procedure for Formation. Amend RSA 195:18, III(g) to read as follows:

(g) The method of apportioning the capital expenses of the cooperative school district among the several preexisting districts, which need not be the same as the method for apportioning operating expenses, and the time and manner of payment of such shares. Capital expenses shall include the costs of acquiring land and buildings for school purposes, including property owned by a preexisting district; the construction, furnishing and equipping of school buildings and facilities; and the payment of the principal and interest of any indebtedness which is incurred to pay for the same or which is assumed by the cooperative school district. [Home education pupils] Students in a parent-directed instruction program who do not receive services from the cooperative school district[, except an evaluation pursuant to RSA 193-A:6, II,] shall not be included in the average daily membership relative to apportionment formulas.

18 Costs of Capital Outlay and Operation. Amend RSA 195:7, II to read as follows:

II. [Home education pupils] Students in a parent-directed instruction program who do not receive services from the cooperative school district[, except an evaluation pursuant to RSA 193-A:6, II,] shall not be included in the average daily membership relative to apportionment formulas.

19 Repeal. The following law is repealed:

I. RSA 193-A, relative to home education programs.

20 Effective Date. This act shall take effect upon its passage.

2011 House Education Sub-Committee

Chairman Balboni created a sub-committee to merge the three bills, HB 545, HB 301, and HB 595. The members of the sub-committee are: Rep. Jones, Rep. Pitre, Rep. Fleck, and Rep. Shaw; Rep. Jones has been appointed sub-committee chair.

These sub-committee meetings are open to the public, but the public is not invited to speak, only listen.

Subcommittee Work Session: 2/15/2011 8:00 AM LOB 207
Subcommittee Work Session: 2/17/2011 8:00 AM LOB 207
Subcommittee Work Session: 2/22/2011 8:00 AM LOB 207
Subcommittee Work Session: 2/24/2011 9:00 AM LOB 207

On 2/24/2011 the House Education Committee will vote on the "merged" bill in an Executive Session at 1:00 PM in the Legislative Office Building (LOB) in Room 207.

Parents should attend. Older children can sit on benches or on the floor in the hallway and read, while you listen to the session. It's very important to attend.

When speaking to your representatives remind them that our constitutional rights are the only firm ground for us to stand upon during this "merging" process.

Frequently Asked Questions

What's the difference between "instruct" and "educate"?

There is a procedural difference between providing instruction to a child and requiring that the child demonstrate that he is educated. And this doesn't even address the violation of privacy involved in such demonstrations.

When parents are required to provide instruction to their children, this is similar to the requirements placed upon public and private school teachers. This is an input-based requirement.

On the other hand, when parents are required to demonstrate the outcome of that instruction, that the child has been educated to a particular level of academic achievement, this is inequitable. This would be an outcome-based requirement. Public and private school teachers are not required by law to guarantee any particular level of education, or outcome, from their students.

A parent or teacher can only do so much. They can provide instruction and guidance, but the outcome is not predictable. There are no guarantees. Many times the outcome exceeds expectation, but that's no reason to demand any particular outcome from another child. Often a child's mind lays dormant, processing the information. After a period of time needed to integrate his instruction, the child may demonstrate results that meet or even exceed expectation.

Forcing demonstrations of academic accomplishment before a child is ready can be very damaging to the child. Regardless of success or failure to meet arbitrary expectations, parents need to believe in their children and trust in the outcome, that eventually they will succeed. Similarly the state needs to believe in parents and assume they are good citizens acting in good faith and eventually they, too, will succeed.

If parents make it clear that they do not trust the efforts their children are making, the outcome is usually disastrous. Resentment and distrust will erode this parent-child relationship.

Similarly, presumptive distrust of the people undermines the legitimacy of the state, especially when the laws enacted are inequitable and discriminatory. Our legal system is based upon the presumption of innocence.

Why is notification such a big deal?

Notification may sound like a minor issue, especially compared to regulations, which require the maintenance of portfolios for two years and submission to annual evaluations. So, why then is notification such a big deal? Because, it’s a matter of equal treatment before the law.

Parents, who send their children to private schools, are not required to notify anyone in the public school about their decision. They can send their child to an out-of-state boarding school. No one needs to know. Their decision is private and no one doubts their good intentions upon making this decision.

If these parents are not required to notify to the public school about their decision and another group of parents is required, then the law is discriminatory.

If equal treatment before the law is no big deal, then perhaps notification is no big deal either. Fortunately, there are many parents for whom this is a very big deal!

Parents have absolutely no problem disclosing where their child is being instructed so long as the notification requirements are voluntary and equitable.

Parents should not be registered like sex offenders, parolees, or others member of society that cannot trusted to behave properly.

Parents are accountable to their families, their communities, their friends. They do not need to be accountable to the state.

Besides, every person in the state is a now mandatory reporter for abuse and neglect, so when there is a problem it will be reported.

How can legislators be certain that children will receive instruction from parents without oversight?

How can legislators be certain that children will be fed, clothed and cared for without oversight? Clearly, their education concerns are just one of many concerns for these children’s welfare.

Should parents be regulated because they might – hypothetically -- commit an offense? Extrapolate from these parents to all citizens: should citizens be regulated because on occasion some citizens – might -- neglect their duty?

“Innocent until proven guilty” is the presumption upon which our legal system is founded. Lawyers wouldn’t tolerate anything less; from the state law regulating “attorneys and counselors”:

"For the purposes of this section, a citizen shall be presumed to be of good character unless demonstrated otherwise." RSA 311:1

Aren’t parents citizens too? Legislators shouldn't judge parents based on stereotypes, assuming that children in bad neighborhoods won't have good parents. Instead they should make sure the school districts offer services to assist parents without the constant threat of punishment, which deters participation.

There’s a growing number of parents, who are instructing their children outside of schools. No one recruits parents for this task. It’s a grassroots movement. It’s quite similar to the Tea Party movement. Many parents become fed up with public schools, because they don’t address their child’s needs and won’t listen to their concerns. Parents reach their breaking point and leave the public schools. They roll up their sleeves to do the job themselves.

Unfortunately, in 1990 the NH legislature enacted an inequitable law, trampling the rights of parents. Some parents can tolerate more than others; many parents have gone underground to instruct their children. Inequitable laws cause citizens to go underground to protect their rights.

If legislators are truly concerned about children, then they should respect the rights of parents and encourage districts to assist these parents in an open and non-adversarial manner.

Why do NH parents prefer “parent-directed” programs instead of “home education” programs?

When the legislature enacts laws on the right to keep and bear arms, they don't elaborate upon what "gun owners" are allowed to do. They address what every individual citizen is allowed to do.

Similarly, there is no reason for parents to be marginalized into a sub-category of "home educators." It is better that the legislature considers the rights of all parents, not just an artificially created minority. Any parent at any time can exercise these rights.

It's also our hope to separate ourselves from our current inequitable "home education" law that was written by out-of-state lobbyists.

Besides, learning doesn't always happen in one particular location - in the home, or in the car, or at a museum. However, it does generally occur under the direction of a parent. Thus, the name, “parent-directed” learning. It's uniquely New Hampshire. No one else uses it.

State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929)

The NH Supreme Court is not infallible. It failed in its Claremont decision, twisting the constitutional mandate to “cherish” literature and the sciences... to mean “fund” public education. It also failed in 1929 in its Hoyt decision. Review this case and the commentary that follows.

State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929)

State v. Daniels (separate case consolidated with Hoyt)

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

May 7, 1929.

Transferred from Superior Court, Belknap County; Young, Judge.

Complaints by the State against Oscar Hoyt, against Richard Daniels, against Lucius Covey, and against Truman Covey, charging in each case failure to cause child of defendant to attend public school. Case transferred on agreement of parties. Defendants fined $10 each.

Appeals from the Laconia municipal court. The charge in each case is a failure to cause a child of the defendant to attend the public school. Each defendant filed a statement of defense alleging "that on said day said child was instructed and taught by a private tutor in his own home in the studies required to be taught in the public schools to one of his years," and praying that the complaint be dismissed.

The court (Young, J.) denied the motion, and thereupon it was agreed by the parties that if the above statement is a defense as matter of law the complaints shall be dismissed, otherwise each defendant is to be fined $10 and costs; and the case was transferred.

*170 Theo. S. Jewett, of Laconia, solicitor for the State.

Henry D. Yeaton, of Rochester, for defendants.

PEASLEE, C. J.

The constitutionality of the compulsory school attendance statute (P. L. c. 118, §§ 1, 2) has not been considered to be an open question in this state. State v. Jackson, 71 N. H. 552, 53 A. 1021, 60 L. R. A. 739. "Free schooling furnished by the state is not so much a right granted to pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good. If they do not voluntarily attend the schools provided for them, they may be compelled to do so." Fogg v. Board of Education, 76 N. H. 296, 299, 82 A. 173, 175 (37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1110, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 758).

Education in public schools is considered by many to furnish desirable and even essential training for citizenship, apart from that gained by the study of books. The association with those of all classes of society, at an early age and upon a common level, is *171 not unreasonably urged as a preparation for discharging the duties of a citizen. The object of our school laws is not only to protect the state from the consequences of ignorance, but also to guard against the dangers of "incompetent citizenship." Fogg v. Board of Education, supra.

This locally adopted theory of the power of the state over this subject has been somewhat limited by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Prohibition of teaching the German language to children under 14, unless they have completed eighth grade work, was declared to be an infringement of the guaranty of liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U. S. 404, 43 S. Ct. 628, 67 L. Ed. 1047, Holmes and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting.

A statute requiring all children to attend the public school was declared invalid for a like reason. Pierce v. Society, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468. But it was also said in this case that no question was raised as to "the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." 268 U. S. 534 (45 S. Ct. 573).

While these decisions declare the existence of important restrictions upon state power to compel education, there is nothing in them to indicate that the provisions of our statute offend against the federal guaranty of liberty. Under the interpretation of the guaranty, so far as it has been declared, it appears that attendance at some school may still be required, and that the state may supervise the school attended. The power to supervise necessarily involves the power to reject the unfit, and to make it obligatory to submit to supervision. The local statute does not go beyond these requirements.

The state being entitled to supervise education, it is not an answer to a charge of failure to furnish supervised instruction to show that equivalent unsupervised instruction is given. Unless the idea of personal liberty in the matter of educating children, recently developed in the federal decisions, is to be carried to the extreme of saying that the sole obligation that can be imposed upon the parent is to educate, a provision that approval of the parents' method must be obtained by him is not invalid. As those authorities are understood, they do not deny the power of the state to insist upon an approval of the proposed substitute for public school attendance. They do not limit that power to a mere right to inspect what is being done and to prosecute for deficiencies. Reasonable preventive measures may be taken, as well as curative ones. And in this connection a reasonable requirement for submitting the proposed substitute for approval, in advance of putting it into use, may be imposed.

The defendants' claim that the federal guaranty of liberty enables them to set at defiance any attempt of the state to prescribe the means for ascertaining the sufficiency of educational facilities furnished and to be furnished as a substitute for the public school, goes far beyond anything that has been decided to be the law. The declaration in Pierce v. Society, 268 U. S. 510, 534, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468), that "no question is raised" as to certain matters, is understood to mean, or at least to suggest, that power relating thereto remains in the state. In any event, it must mean that lack of such power is neither declared, nor indicated.

The matters so enumerated include all that are involved in this litigation. The power "reasonably to regulate," to require attendance, good character of teachers, studies to be taught, and those to be prohibited, all look to laying down rules for future conduct. As the statute does not exceed the exercise of these powers, it is held to be constitutional.

In the adjustment of the parent's right to choose the manner of his children's education, and the impinging right of the state to insist that certain education be furnished and supervised, the rule of reasonable conduct upon the part of each towards the other is to be applied. The state must bear the burden of reasonable supervision, and the parent must offer educational facilities which do not require unreasonable supervision.

If the parent undertakes to make use of units of education so small, or facilities of such doubtful quality, that supervision thereof would impose an unreasonable burden upon the state, he offends against the reasonable provisions for schools which can be supervised without unreasonable expense. The state may require, not only that educational facilities be supplied, but also that they be so supplied that the facts in relation thereto can be ascertained, and proper direction thereof maintained, without unreasonable cost to the state. Anything less than this would take from the state all-efficient authority to regulate the education of the prospective voting population.

If any substantial supervisory power remains to the states, it is not perceived how it could well be reduced below the minimum required here. This bears no resemblance to the "affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such schools," which was held to be invalid in *172 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 406, 71 L. Ed. 646.

Although the defendants' brief is prefaced by a declaration that the constitutional question is the only one raised by the case, much of the argument which follows is upon the construction of the statute. The claim made it that furnishing equivalent book-learning is an answer to a charge of failing to cause a child to attend school. The statute makes no such exception to the duty imposed. The only substitute for the public school is an approved private school. P. L. c. 118, § 1.

If the defendants' allegations that "said child was taught by a private tutor in his own home" could be construed to set forth attendance at a private school (see State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910, 41 L. R. A. [N. S.] 95), there is no allegation that the enterprise has been designated as a private school "to be treated as approved within the meaning of this title." P. L. c. 116, § 11, par. XXVIII. Not having been approved as required by the statute, it is not "an approved private school." P. L. c. 118, § 1.

Decisions from other jurisdictions, which are based upon statutes making the attainment of certain proficiency by the child, or furnishing a certain amount of instruction, an excuse for nonattendance at the public school (Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N. E. 402; Bevan v. Shears [[1911] 2 K. B. 936), are not applicable here, because our statute makes no such exception. However accomplished or precocious the child may be, school attendance until he is 14 years old is required. The exception because of knowledge acquired applies only to those between 14 and 16 (P. L. c. 118, § 1); and the other excuses for nonattendance there provided are immaterial in the present case.

Varying the statement a little, the argument is advanced that the only object of the statute is to compel a certain amount of proper instruction and study, and that proof thereof is an answer to the charge in any event. This claim fails to take into account the true nature of the charge. While the ultimate object of the statute is the education of the child, means to assure the attainment of that end may be adopted by the state, and may be enforced by the imposition of penalties for violating the regulations made. As stated earlier in this opinion, the state is entitled to establish a system whereby it can be known, by reasonable means, that the required teaching is being done.

The statement of defense, in the motions to dismiss the complaints, does not allege a compliance with the statute. In accordance with the agreement of the parties as to the disposition of the cases, the order is:

Defendants fined $10 each.

All concurred.

END OF OPINION

Note: Hoyt rested upon Prussian-Platonic philosophy, declaring that "[f]ree schooling . . . is not so much a right granted to pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good." Compulsory education's impact upon the individual child was irrelevant, and it did not matter if the child's progress was slowed or if the child already understood the academic material presented. Compulsory education was primarily and explicitly an instrument of state indoctrination needed to maintain an "all-efficient authority to regulate the education of the prospective voting population," thereby preventing "incompetent citizenship." Hoyt's doctrine of cultural cleansing was intertwined with the eugenics movement. Compare Hoyt with Mein Kampf and In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

By endorsing state-sponsored informational servitude, Hoyt implicitly assumed that 1) the state can and should define what constitutes "competent" citizenship and appropriate voter behavior; 2) citizens exist with a duty to serve the state, not vice versa; 3) "competent citizenship" is a static concept inculcated by a central authority, not an evolving concept gradually refined over the generations by independent thinkers; 4) one standardized method of mass instruction is appropriate for educating the entire population of children; and 5) a group of people with average intelligence can impose a better concept of "competent citizenship" upon a precocious child than the child can eventually develop for others through the use of self-initiated learning.

Hoyt was the seminal case used by New Englanders to maintain their control over United States education, notwithstanding an inconvenient string of four United States Supreme Court decisions during the 1920's (Meyer, Bartels, Pierce, and Farrington). Hoyt formed the bedrock precedent for subsequent adverse decisions rendered against alternative educators in state courts across the United States from 1929 to 1972. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court became troubled by the cultural genocide inflicted against the Mennonites by public educators in a number of states. The United States Supreme Court handed down Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), to reaffirm the principle of educational freedom and remind states of the Court's previous precedent from the 1920's.

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